FLOUTING THE LAW
JANICE NADLER

What happens when a person’s common sense view of justice
diverges from the sense of justice he or she sees enshrined in
particular laws? In particular, does the perception of one particular
law as unjust make an individual less likely to comply with
unrelated laws? This Article advances the Flouting Thesis – the idea
that the perceived legitimacy of one law can influence one’s
willingness to comply with unrelated laws – and provides original
experimental evidence to support this thesis. This Article presents
new, original evidence that one’s willingness to disobey the law can
extend far beyond the particular unjust law in question, to the
flouting of unrelated laws commonly encountered in everyday life
(such as traffic violations, petty theft, and copyright restrictions). A
second experiment demonstrated that when exposure to a perceived
unjust outcome made gender salient by highlighting an instance in
which the law fails to punish a male perpetrator involved in a crime
of violence against a female victim, the relationship between
perceived injustice and compliance was affected by group identity.
Finally, the Article explores the relationship between perceived
injustice and flouting and offers several possible explanations,
including the role of law in American popular culture, and the
expressive function of the law in producing compliance.
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INTRODUCTION
Do ordinary citizens flout the law in response to a specific
instance of perceived injustice? The idea that general lawbreaking
can emerge from one unjust legal doctrine or decision has intuitive
appeal. For example, Professor David Cole has argued that
constitutional doctrines that allow untrammeled police discretion -such as that which led to the brutal beating of Rodney King in Los
Angeles or the tragic police shooting of Amadou Diallo in New York
-- can undermine the public’s perception of the legitimacy of law
enforcement generally.1 This loss of legitimacy and distrust of the
fairness of the legal system, Cole argues, can in turn lead to more
widespread lawbreaking.2
The Rodney King example is instructive in this regard. In
1992, the acquittal of the four police officers who beat Rodney King
touched off the worst civil unrest seen in any American city in nearly
30 years. The streets of Los Angeles became the site of chaos and
lawlessness for four days, as city residents looted stores, destroyed
property, assaulted and shot one another, and set fires to buildings.
When it was over, more than fifty people were dead,3 over 12,000
people were arrested,4 and over 800 buildings were burned to the
ground.5 Undoubtedly, the causes contributing to the expression of
community frustration during this time are numerous and complex.
However, there is no doubt that the perceived injustice of the
acquittals of the police officers was a “proximate” cause of the 1992
civil unrest in Los Angeles.6
See David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 Geo. L.J. 1059, 1090-91 (1999); see also DAVID COLE,
NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 169-80 (1999). Indeed Cole argues that for people who distrust the legal
system, violation of the law is often “romanticized, idealized, condoned, or even
celebrated.” Id. at 1091.
2 Id.
3 See Washington Post, April 28, 1997, at A04, Scars Remain Five Years After Los
Angeles Riots, by Lou Cannon.
4 See The Boston Globe, May 5, 1992, at 13, Life Regains its Bustle in Los Angeles,
by Diego Ribadeneira.
5 See Washington Post, supra note 3.
6 The initial beating incident and subsequent trial were both widely publicized; the
videotape of the beatings was played repeatedly in the months leading up to the
trial; the jury’s decision to acquit the police officers was widely held to be unjust.
1

8/30/2004

FLOUTING THE LAW

3

The 1992 Los Angeles example is an extreme one to be sure.
At the same time, it suggests further, more general questions –
questions that are at bottom empirical -- about whether and under
what circumstances citizens’ perceptions of injustice lead to
diminished deference to the law generally. Does perceived injustice
in our legal system -- whether in the form of wrongful convictions or
acquittals, excessive punitive damage awards, outmoded public
morals statutes, crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparities,
mandatory minimum sentencing regimes -- lead to greater
willingness to flout the law in the everyday lives of ordinary people?
Further, assuming that this is the case, does flouting typically
manifest itself not in mass unrest but in more subtle, lower-level,
harder-to-detect ways, such as littering, tax cheating, theft of
services, and jury nullification?
The idea that there is a relationship between perceived
injustice of specific laws and diminished general compliance with
the law has been either proposed or assumed by many theorists in a
variety of contexts. 7 For the purposes of discussion in this Article, I
call this idea the Flouting Thesis. Despite its prominence, there is,
however, a glaring absence of empirical evidence regarding the
Flouting Thesis, which has been widely assumed but never proven.8
Investigating the possibility that lawbreaking can flow from
perceived injustice is central to our understanding of how to secure
citizen cooperation and compliance with legal rules, and so the lack
of empirical investigation regarding the Flouting Thesis is puzzling.
This Article begins to fill this void by presenting the first
experimental evidence for the Flouting Thesis, and by empirically
See The Economist, April 22, 1992, Page 22, World Politics and Current Affairs;
American Survey. For some, these feelings of injustice were so strong that they led
to extreme frustration and anger, as evidenced by the sharp increase in
lawbreaking over the next few days.
7 See infra Section II.
8 Although different but related theories have been tested empirically – see Section
II infra – an exhaustive literature search revealed no experimental test of the thesis
that there is a relationship between perceived injustice of legal rules or decisions
and reduced compliance with the law generally. In other work, I have emphasized
the importance, as a general matter, of reducing arbitrariness in the application of
the law. See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of
Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153; Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact
Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419 (2003).
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confirming that perceived9 legal injustices can have subtle but
pervasive influences on a person’s deference to the law in his or her
everyday life. In this Article, I argue that Americans are culturally
attentive to law, and feel concerned when they notice injustice in the
legal system. When a person evaluates particular legal rules,
decisions, or practices as unjust, the diminished respect for the legal
system that follows can destabilize otherwise law-abiding behavior.
Because there are reasons for obeying the law apart from the threat
of sanctions, obedience to law is vulnerable to diminished respect
produced by perceptions of injustice.10
The broader focus of this Article is on the ways in which law
can influence citizen behavior other than through threatened
punishment. As such this Article is part of a broader movement
emerging in legal scholarship that examines theories of expressive
law.11 For example, Cass Sunstein and others have argued that, in
addition to influencing behavior directly, law also can make a
statement that strengthens desirable norms and weakens undesirable
norms.12 For example, anti-discrimination laws may have weakened
the norm of racial discrimination; laws that require clean-up after
one’s pet may strengthen the norm of cleaning up, even in the
absence of enforcement.13 Others, such as Richard McAdams have
focused on the mechanisms through which the values the law
expresses can induce compliance, quite independently from the

9

I use the term “perceived injustice” throughout the paper because my focus is on
the psychology of justice, and more specifically, on the justice perceptions of
ordinary people. I do not address in this paper philosophical issues regarding
justice, and I make no assumptions about the actual justness of the underlying
legal rules or legal outcomes that I discuss.
10 In addition to providing original experimental evidence for the Flouting Thesis,
a key objective of this Article is to draw attention to the necessity for further
empirical and theoretical investigation.
11 The idea that law has a symbolic function apart from directing behavior by
imposing punishment on violators is fundamental to the law and society literature.
See, e.g., JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 112 (1974).
12 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996). Similarly, Lawrence Lessig has argued that law can change the norms that
underlie the social meaning associated with the behavior regulated. See Lawrence
Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996).
13 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2032, 2043.
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sanctions the law threatens. 14 For example, laws banning smoking
signaled to smokers a new societal consensus that exposing others to
smoke is offensive and antisocial, triggering smokers to refrain from
smoking in certain public places for fear of enduring objections from
people nearby.15 The anti-smoking values expressed by law induced
smokers to comply with minimal state enforcement of anti-smoking
ordinances. More closely related to the topic of this Article, scholars
focusing on compliance with criminal law have also noted that the
expressive power of law can backfire when a law inadvertently
generates disrespect. For example, a well-publicized government
crackdown on tax cheating can implicitly send the message that
everyone cheats, thereby generating more cheating than would be
observed without the crackdown.16 More generally, these scholars
argue that when law is perceived as failing to accurately reflect
popular notions of justice, then citizens will be less likely to view the
law as a moral authority that guides their own behavior.17 It is this
theory of expressive law that I test empirically in this Article.
Before presenting the evidence that injustice can encourage
lawbreaking, I first discuss in Part I the theoretical and empirical
underpinnings of the Flouting Thesis, including the reasons for
believing that perceived unjust laws can generate general disrespect
and increased lawbreaking. In Part II, I report the results of two
original laboratory experiments which suggest that perceived legal
injustice can indeed reduce people’s willingness to obey laws in their
everyday lives, like speed limits and copyright restrictions, and can
also reduce citizens’ willingness to follow the law in their role as
jurors in the courtroom. In Part III of the Article I explore potential
explanations for why perceived injustice in the legal system might

See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 355 (1997). See also Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order
Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 390, 401-02 (1994), ("The route by which laws create and maintain
order is through the creation or alteration of social norms . . . Our thesis is that
decentralized order is accomplished by internalizing as social norms those laws
that are just and perceived to be fair.").
15 See McAdams, supra note 14. at 405.
16 See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U.L. REV. 333 (2001).
17 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U.L. REV.
453 (1997).
14
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cause citizens to have less deference for the law; in Part IV I discuss
possible remedies.
In this Article I describe two experiments in which I expose
people to instances of legal injustice, and then measure their
willingness to break the law in their everyday lives. Together, these
two experiments contemplate two different prototypes of perceived
injustice in the law that can have consequences that reach beyond the
rule or case in question. The first (examined in Experiment 1) is a
legal rule that is viewed by most people as being ill-conceived, such
as a rule permitting the government to seize the property of an
innocent farmer who whose land is used by a marijuana grower. The
second (examined in Experiment 2) is a legal result whereby the law
does not punish a person who is viewed by most people as
deserving of punishment.18 The results of these two experiments
show empirically that discrepancies between common sense justice
and legal practices have behavioral consequences, as well as advance
the discussion about how to reduce these discrepancies by
selectively harmonizing legal rules and social norms.
I. THEORIES OF LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND PERCEIVED INJUSTICE
As noted earlier, perceived legal injustice can take a variety of
forms. The 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest arose as a response to
public outrage about acquittals in a widely-publicized criminal trial.
Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that clash with strongly held
popular beliefs are a second form of perceived injustice. Indeed,
certain Justices of the U. S. Supreme Court at various times have
assumed the truth of the Flouting Thesis when faced with the
prospect that the Court’s announced decision will be at odds with
commonsense justice. For example, in discussing the permissibility
of police wiretapping without a search warrant, Justice Brandeis
argued in his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States: “If the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
18

There are undoubtedly many other types and sources of perceived legal
injustice. Accordingly, this Article does not aspire to enumerate the all of the
boundary conditions of the relationship between perceived injustice and
lawbreaking – there are many possible circumstances under which the law can
inadvertently generate disrespect, and this Article does not seek to catalog them
here.
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invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.”19 Similarly, in discussing the application of antitrust laws
to baseball, Justice Marshall expressed concern that the Court’s
decision would undermine respect for law:
…[T]he jurist concerned with public confidence in, and
acceptance of the judicial system might well consider that,
however admirable its resolute adherence to the law as it
was, a decision contrary to the public sense of justice as it is,
operates, so far as it is known, to diminish respect for the
courts and for law itself.20

Perceived injustice can also arise from criminal punishment
schemes that do not accurately reflect commonsense notions of
desert. A variety of criminal law theorists and philosophers of law
have recognized the possibility that disproportionate punishments
can promote lawbreaking among citizens. For example, H. L. A. Hart
argued that, in designing a morally acceptable system of criminal
punishment, we should draw upon common sense notions regarding
appropriate punishment given the gravity of the offense in question.
He contended that if legally defined gradation of crimes differed
sharply from the commonsense consensus, “there is a risk of either
confusing common morality or flouting it and bringing the law into
contempt.”21 Similarly, Kent Greenawalt has proposed that
punishment schemes based on retributive principles can promote
compliance with the law:
The idea is that since people naturally think in retributive
terms, they will be disenchanted and eventually less lawabiding if the law does not recognize that offenders should
receive the punishment they "deserve."22
19

277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293, n.4 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Szanton, Stare Decisis; A Dissenting View, 10 HASTINGS L. J. 394, 397 (1959).
21 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 25 (1968).
22 Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 359 (1983).
Scholars of law and society have long recognized the possibility of the Flouting
Thesis. For example, in 1975, Lawrence Friedman wrote:
If a person sees unfairness or illegitimacy or unworthiness of trust
in one instance, how far does his disillusionment extend? How
much of his attitude spills over into other areas and into his actual
20
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Paul Robinson and John Darley have offered the most
comprehensive theoretical treatment of the “utility of desert”: the
notion that by tying criminal liability and punishment to
community-based notions of justice and desert, public compliance
with the law will increase.23 Robinson and Darley argue that when
the criminal law gains a reputation for assigning liability and
punishment in ways that track the intuition of the community as a
whole, it is more likely to be viewed as morally authoritative. As a
result, people are more likely to defer to the commands of the law
generally.24 Robinson and Darley argue that most people obey the
law as a general matter not so much because they are deterred by the
possibility of being caught and punished, but because they either
fear disapproval from their social group or they want to do the
morally correct thing (or both).25 But the norms held by one’s social
group are themselves influenced and strengthened by the criminal
law. Every criminal adjudication offers an opportunity to remind the
public of the underlying norm that prohibits the conduct in
question.26 Legislative proposals for new criminal law rules provide
an occasion for public debate that strengthens the shared
understanding of what conduct is prohibited. Further, if the law has
moral credibility, it can guide behavior in situations in which the
harm underlying the prohibition is not immediately obvious.27
According to Robinson and Darley, then, the moral credibility
of the law can strengthen social norms and increase compliance.
Because moral credibility plays a key role here, it is important to

behavior? The hypocrisy and unfairness of Prohibition, it is said,
brought the whole legal system into disrepute. Legal scholars
claim that marijuana laws ‘hasten the erosion of respect for the
law.’ But how much ‘erosion of respect’? And where? And what
are the consequences?
Lawrence Friedman, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
119 (1975). It is the answers to these open questions that I investigate
experimentally in this Article.
23 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U.L. Rev. 453
(1997).
24 Id. at 457.
25 Id. 468-69.
26 Id. at 472.
27 Id. at 475-76.
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understand how the law comes to be viewed as a moral authority in
the first place. Robinson and Darley contend that the criminal law
gains moral credibility from imposing liability and punishment only
on conduct that deserves moral condemnation, and, conversely,
from not imposing liability or punishment for conduct that does not
deserve moral condemnation.28 When a particular criminal rule
conflicts with the moral intuitions of the governed community, the
power of the criminal law as a whole to induce compliance is in
jeopardy, because it is no longer viewed as a trustworthy source of
information regarding which actions are moral and which are not.29
In sum, this version of the Flouting Thesis derives from the claim
that adopting desert-based (retributive) notions of criminal liability
and punishment that closely track community intuitions has the
advantage of promoting compliance.30
It is worthy to note at this point that all of the variations on
Flouting Thesis reviewed so far share an important feature – they
have never been tested. Although related theories have been tested
empirically,31 an exhaustive literature search revealed no
experimental test of the thesis that there is a relationship between
perceived injustice of particular legal rules or decisions and reduced
compliance with the law generally. In the next Part, I present the
results of two experiments designed to test this claim.
II. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FOR THE FLOUTING THESIS
A. Background: Related Theories and Evidence
Whereas there is no existing empirical evidence examining the
connection between perceived injustice of a particular legal rule or
decision and general noncompliance, there is evidence on associated
questions. This evidence shows that first, people are most likely to
obey laws that prohibit conduct they already view as morally
reprehensible. For example, people who feel strongly that an activity

Id. at 477-78. There are separate questions of how a person decides which
conduct deserves moral condemnation. These questions about the psychology of
assigning blame and punishment is beyond the scope of this Article.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31 See Section II.A. infra.
28
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prohibited by a particular criminal offense (for example, larceny) is
morally wrong are least likely to report having committed that
offense; likewise, people who feel less strongly that the offense is
morally wrong are most likely to report having committed the
offense.32 In addition to moral attitudes about specific crimes, moral
attitudes about the legal system in general predict compliance with
particular laws. For example, feelings of obligation to obey the law in
general (for example, the belief that “people should obey the law
even if they disagree”) predict whether people will comply with
laws governing everyday acts such as littering, making noise,
parking, and the like.33 Note that this is a different question than the
question of interest in this Article: variations in feelings of obligation
to obey the law generally can arise for many different reasons,
including pre-existing variations across individuals (due to
personality, political and moral values, and the like). By contrast, the
question of interest in this Article focuses on the problem of a
particular legal doctrine, rule, decision, or practice viewed by an
entire community as unjust, and the subsequent effects on not only
feelings of obligation to obey the law, but also on behavioral
compliance with laws in general.

See Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of Criminal Deterrence, 41 AM. SOC. REV.
442, 445 (1976). Similarly, Grasmick & Green surveyed people about their
compliance with eight different criminal laws and obtained similar findings; they
found that the people with high levels of moral commitment toward a particular
law are more likely to report compliance with that law. Harold G. Grasmick &
Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval, and Internalization as
Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 325, 334 (1980).
33 TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 41-68 (1990) (perceived legitimacy of
legal authorities promotes compliance with the law). Compliance with the law in
Tyler's study was associated with two main factors -- the extent to which people
felt that the particular conduct prohibited by the law is morally wrong (consistent
with the results reported by Silberman (1976) and Gramick & Green (1980), id.),
and the extent to which people felt generally that the law is something that
deserves respect and ought to be obeyed. The first factor -- moral attitude toward
the conduct underlying a particular law -- was associated with compliance with
the law only to the extent that a person's moral attitude converged with the law
with respect to the conduct in question. In this sense, moral judgments about
particular laws can motivate people to comply with the law, but only selectively.
To the extent that moral attitudes and the law diverged with respect to any
particular conduct, compliance is less likely to follow.
32
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Perhaps most closely addressing the specific question that this
Article addresses -- that of the relationship between perceived
injustice in the law in a particular instance and more general
attitudes about respect for the law and compliance -- is a survey
study of tax compliance.34 In the survey, people reported on both
their own experiences with the IRS, and on second-hand information
about friends, neighbors, and coworkers’ experiences with the IRS.
Especially revealing were the attitudes of people who reported that a
friend, neighbor, or coworker’s contact with the IRS resulted in that
person paying more taxes than they supposedly owed. This type of
vicarious experience with the IRS was associated with lower
perceptions of the fairness of tax laws generally, and increased
intentions to cheat on taxes in the future.35
The results of the tax study suggest that exposure to reports of
an unjust legal outcome in a particular situation might lead to lower
perceived fairness of the law more generally, which in turn can lead
to non
- compliance with the law in the future. The conclusions to be
drawn from the tax survey results are, however, limited in several
important respects. First, the data were correlational, so that the
causal direction (if causation can be inferred at all) of the connection
between exposure to a perceived unjust outcome and lower
intentions to comply with the law is ambiguous. It might be, for
example, that a person’s intention to cheat her own taxes produced
an evaluation that others’ experiences with the IRS were unfair.
Second, the tax survey study addressed only the limited
question of whether the justice of an outcome relating to one law (or
set of laws) is associated with lower future compliance with that
same law (or set of laws) -- in this case, tax laws.36 The claim I test in
this Article, by contrast, is a stronger one: perceived injustice of a
particular law diminishes respect for the law in general, which is
manifested in lower levels of compliance with other laws, even those
distinct from and unrelated to the source of the perceived injustice.
The experimental data reported below show empirically that legal
injustice can trigger diminished compliance, not only with respect to
See, Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An
analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT 264-276 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
35
Id.
36 Id.
34
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the unjust law in question, but also with respect to other unrelated
laws. In the remainder of this Part, I use original empirical results to
show that perceived injustice in a legal rule can generate broader
flouting of the law in everyday life.
B. Experiment 1: Testing the Flouting Thesis via Intentions to
Comply
1. Background
To test the plausibility of the Flouting Thesis, I identified a
specific underlying hypothesis and tested it experimentally.
According to the Flouting Thesis, the belief that a particular law is
unjust increases the likelihood of flouting the law in one’s own daily
life (even laws that are unrelated to the unjust law in question);
conversely, the absence of perceived injustice should not increase
flouting behavior. In the experiment, I presented a set of ostensible
proposed legislation designed to be interpreted as either just or
unjust. By carefully varying the description of the ostensible
legislation, I ensured (through pilot testing) that participants
perceived the laws in question as basically unjust (treatment group)
or as basically just (control group). According to the Flouting Thesis,
the participant’s attitude regarding the perceived justice of laws
should diminish his or her willingness to comply with different,
unrelated laws.
The predictions of the Flouting Thesis focus essentially on a set
of behavioral results: compliance with the law. At the same time, the
predictive variable of the Flouting Thesis is a set of attitudes (about
the injustice of specific laws). Generally speaking, however, the
relationship between attitudes and behavior is not always
straightforward.37 One of the factors upon which the relevant
behavioral response depends is the accessibility in memory of the
attitude in question. The more easily an attitude is called to mind,
37

Indeed, the conditions under which people exhibit consistency between their
attitudes and their behavior is a question that social psychologists continue to
debate. See, e.g., Icek Ajzen, T.C. Brown, & F. Carvahal, Explaining the Discrepancy
Between Intentions and Actions: The Case of Hypothetical Bias in Contingent Valuation.
30 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN, 1108 (in press); R. LaPiere,
Attitudes and Actions. 13 SOCIAL FORCES 230 (1934).
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the more likely it is to influence the cognitive structure of the
behavioral event in question, and thus the more likely a response
will follow that is behaviorally congruent with the attitude.38 In the
context of perceptions of the law, the extent to which an attitude
about the justice of a particular law affects compliance behavior may
depend on the extent to which that attitude is accessible.39
Thus, for the purposes of this experiment, it was important to
ensure the salience in memory of the attitudes in question, here the
perceived justice of the laws presented. For this reason, this study
used a priming method in which the attitude is called to mind, and is
accessible at the time compliance behavior is measured.40
2. Experimental Method
The experiment consisted of two parts. First, participants were
exposed to a set of laws (perceived as either just or unjust) in the
form of newspaper stories. Participants read six news stories, three
of which focused on a legal issue, and the remaining three did not.
The three news stories describing legal statutes were interspersed
with the non-legal news stories, thus focusing attention away from
the purely legal nature of the task. Then, in an ostensibly separate
study, the same people indicated their willingness to flout a set of
unrelated laws in the future. Willingness to disobey the law
(flouting) was measured using a questionnaire focusing on
intentions to engage in fairly common, but legally prohibited, acts.
Newspaper stories were chosen to present the laws of interest
in the first part of the experiment for several reasons. First, material
presented in a newspaper story format has inherent appeal as a
current event item and is therefore more likely to engage people’s
interest when compared to the sometimes dense language used in
legal statutes. Indeed, other research has demonstrated that in
reading newspaper stories about current events can increase a

See Russell H. Fazio, How do Attitudes Guide Behavior? IN HANDBOOK OF
MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 204-243 (Richard
M. Sorrentino & E.Tory Higgins eds., 1986).
39 In other words, the more salient an attitude is in memory, the more likely the
resulting behavioral response will be attitudinally congruent.
40 A prime is a means of accessing or activating stored thoughts and concepts.
38
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person’s societal-level concern about the problem at hand.41 Second,
newspaper stories provided a convenient cover story for the first
part of the experiment. Participants were told that the researchers
were interested in their emotional reactions to the quality of the
writing and the style of journalism in the news stories. In the absence
of such a cover story, participants have been left to speculate about
the purpose of reading legal statutes.
The participants were 98 undergraduate students.42 Upon
entering the laboratory and signing a consent form, participants
were informed that they would be participating in a study on the
role of emotions in attitudes about news stories. Participants each
read a set of six articles that were ostensibly newspaper stories.43
Three of these were filler stories (on NASA, oil drilling, and movie
ushers), which were identical in content for all participants. Three
were stories describing legislation, for which there were two
versions – one set of stories was designed to elicit a perception that
the laws described therein are just (Just Prime condition), and the
other set was designed to elicit a perception that the laws described
therein are unjust (Unjust Prime condition). The content of each
version varied slightly from its counterpart, depending on the
experimental condition. The basic topics of the law-related stories
are illustrated in Table 1. Perceived justness was manipulated by
varying each story’s emphasis, as follows:

See, Tom R. Tyler & Fay L. Cook, The Mass Media and Judgments of Risk:
Distinguishing Impact on Personal and Societal Level Judgments, 47 J. PERS. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 693 (1984).
42 Of these participants, there were 54 females, 44 males, 27 African-Americans, 24
Asians or Asian-Americans, 23 Hispanics, 22 whites, and 2 self-designated as
“other”.
43 The length of all stories was kept constant at approximately 500 words.
41
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TABLE 1. CONTENT OF NEWSPAPER STORIES CONTAINING PRIMES
NEWS
STORY
Civil
Forfeiture

General Emphasis (both
versions)
Purpose and application of
(actual) laws permitting the
government to seize property
under certain circumstances

Just Prime Version

Income
Tax

Proposed legislation
ostensibly pending before
Congress that would affect the
amount of income tax paid by
middle-class taxpayers

Emphasized positive
effects of income tax
paid by middle-class
people

Emphasized
negative effects
of income tax
paid by middleclass people

Landlord/
Tenant

Proposed legislation
ostensibly pending before the
state legislature that would
permit landlords to conduct
warrantless searches of
tenants’ apartments under
certain circumstances

Emphasized
importance of
empowering landlords
to evict drug dealing
tenants

Emphasized the
civil liberties and
privacy concerns
in permitting
searches of
tenants’
apartments

Emphasized the lawenforcement benefits
of civil forfeiture laws

Unjust Prime
Version
Emphasized the
civil liberties
concerns
surrounding civil
forfeiture laws

A pilot test of the materials using different participants44
indicated that the legal rules described in the three law-related
newspaper stories presented in the Just Prime condition were
perceived to be significantly more just, on average, than those
presented in the Unjust Prime condition.45
Participants were randomly assigned to the Just Prime or
Unjust Prime condition. After reading each of the six stories,
participants answered a “quiz” question, to ensure they actually
read the story. In addition, following each story participants filled
out a questionnaire assessing their opinion of the journalistic quality
44

The participants in the pilot test were drawn from the same undergraduate
population as those in the experiment itself.
45 Eighty-eight undergraduate psychology students participated in the pilot study.
Each participant read one version of each of the three articles, and rated the extent
to which the law described in the article was either just or unjust (1=extremely
unjust; 9=extremely just). Mean ratings in the Just Prime condition (M=5.05) were
significantly higher than mean ratings in the Unjust Prime condition (M=2.95);
t(86) = -9.25; p < .0001. Most participants (39 out of 44) in the Just Prime condition
assigned ratings of 5 or above to the stories; nearly all participants (43 out of 44) in
the Unjust Prime condition assigned ratings of below 5.
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of the story they just read.46 The experimenter then collected all
materials, thanked the participants, and left the room.
Shortly after the first experimenter left, a different
experimenter entered the room and asked participants to sign a
different consent form, explaining that they would be asked to
participate in a second short experiment. After completing a short
filler task, participants completed the Likelihood of Criminal
Behavior Questionnaire. In this questionnaire, participants were
asked to indicate the likelihood (from 0% to 100%) that they would
engage in a variety of illegal behaviors. These items consisted of:
drunk driving; parking in a no-parking zone; failing to pay required
taxes; making illegal copies of software; eating a small item without
paying in the grocery store; exceeding the posted speed limit;
drinking alcohol under age 21; and taking home office supplies for
personal use.47
3. Experimental Results
An analysis of each individual questionnaire item reveals
that, there is an overall trend:48 participants exposed to unjust laws
indicated a greater likelihood of engaging in each criminal behavior
compared to those exposed to just laws. This is illustrated in Figure
1.49

46

Participants were asked to indicate the story’s clarity, conciseness, level of
interest, and so forth.
47 I chose these particular crimes to maximize variation in responses. Considering
the range of acts that are prohibited by the criminal law, the six that I tested are
fairly common among those who consider themselves law abiding citizens. Had I
chosen relatively more serious crimes such as murder or robbery, the responses
would have likely been clustered near 0%, making it difficult to detect any
differences attributable to the unjust prime.
48 The tax item is the only item in Figure 1 in which there is no apparent difference
between those primed with Just laws and those primed with Unjust laws. Note,
however, that participants were undergraduate students, with a mean age of 18.7.
Most of them probably have had little or no experience in filing an income tax
return.
49 In Figure 1, the scores are presented in raw, rather than standardized, form, for
ease of presentation and interpretation. Item labels marked with one asterisk are
associated with a test statistic with a p-value less than 0.10; two asterisks indicate a
p value less than .05.
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FIGURE 1: WILLINGNESS TO FLOUT AS A FUNCTION OF EXPOSURE TO UNJUST LAWS
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Figure 1 indicates that, consistent with the Flouting Thesis,
people exposed to the three newspaper stories describing perceived
unjust laws are more willing to park illegally, copy unlicensed
software, consume grocery items without paying, and pilfer office
supplies, compared to those exposed to perceived just laws.50
A reliability analysis (Cronbach’s Alpha) indicated that the
eight questionnaire items could be combined into a single measure
50

For DWI, speeding, and underage drinking, the patterns were consistent with
the Flouting Thesis, but the apparent differences did not reach conventional levels
of statistical significance. Note that attitudes toward drunk driving have shifted
fairly dramatically in the last decade or so, coinciding with moral campaigns
against drunk driving (the most well-known proponent is Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (MADD)). See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the
Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 634 (2000). Because of the stigma
currently associated with drunk driving, participants may have been reluctant to
admit to doing it, and as a result, and there may be a “floor effect” here (the ability
to detect differences is limited because all scores are low). Also note possible
ceiling effects (all scores are high) with speeding and underage drinking.
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of Likelihood of Criminal Behavior,51 which was computed by
summing scores across items.52 The standardized53 Likelihood of
Criminal Behavior Index scores ranged from a low of -11.95 to a high
of 12.38. Overall, participants exposed to newspaper stories
describing laws perceived as unjust indicated a significantly54 greater
mean willingness to engage in criminal behavior (M = 1.15)
compared to participants exposed to laws perceived as just (M = 0.97).55 Thus, exposure to a legal rule generally perceived to be
unjust leads to personal estimations of a greater likelihood of

51 Cronbach’s
= .82. Chronbach’s alpha is a measure of the reliability and internal
consistency of a scale. Possible values range from 0 to 1. See WILLIAM L. HAYS,
STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 230-66 (3d ed. 1981).
52 Prior to being debriefed, participants completed an Exit Questionnaire designed
to determine whether they were suspicious that the two parts of the experiment
were related. The questionnaire asked participants to indicate how many studies
they participated in during the course of the hour, the purpose of the studies, and
the possible relationship between the studies. An examination of the Exit
Questionnaire responses revealed that none of the participants were suspicious as
to the priming function of the first part of the experiment. Specifically, in response
to the question about how many experiments they had participated in, 100% of the
participants indicated that they had participated in two experiments. In response
to the question about the purpose of the studies, 0% of the participants indicated
they thought there was any possible connection between the two tasks. Finally, in
response to the question about whether they thought their responses in the first
study could have affected their judgments in the second study, all but two
participants responded “No.” These two respondents were nevertheless unable to
articulate any basis of substantive influence of the first study on their responses in
the second study. Moreover, excluding their data does not change the pattern of
results reported.
53 Scores were standardized prior to being combined to account for differences in
measurement scales across variables. Standardizing scores distributes them across
the same metric with Mean=0 and Standard Deviation=1. See WILLIAM L. HAYS,
STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 230-66 (3d ed. 1981).
54 Throughout this Article, "significantly" refers to statistical significance, which
denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis - the possibility of no differences
between the various groups - at a probability level indicated by the p value
reported. Thus, "p" is defined as the probability of finding a difference or
relationship between two groups as large as that observed if there were, in fact, no
difference or relationship between them. See WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS FOR THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 230-66 (3d ed. 1981).
55 t(96) = 2.02; p < .05. The t statistic reported throughout this Article tests for
differences between two independent parametric samples. Id.
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expressed willingness to engage in unrelated future criminal
behavior.56
C. Experiment 2: Testing the Flouting Thesis viaJ uror Behavior
1. Background
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that when people are
exposed to unjust laws they are more willing to engage in everyday
lawbreaking, such as traffic and software violations. The method
used in Experiment 1 relies on self-reports -- after being exposed to
just or unjust legal rules, participants estimated the likelihood that
they would break the law in the future. These self-reports suggest
that the prime had differential effects on participants’ attitudes; yet
we cannot definitively predict behavior from such responses.57 In
particular, measuring behavioral compliance with the law is difficult
because of the ethical and practical problems inherent in such an
inquiry. Ethically, difficulties arise if participants have been induced
or encouraged to violate the law.58
56

It is notable that the exposure to perceived unjust laws was minimal in this
experiment -- the task of reading all six news items, and answering the quiz and
filler questions was completed in less than 35 minutes. Yet, this short exposure
was sufficient to significantly influence people’s expressed willingness to engage
in unlawful behaviors in their everyday lives. In addition, participants were
apparently unaware of the influence that the newspaper stories had on their
willingness to comply with the law: when explicitly asked whether the newspaper
articles affected their judgments about compliance with the law, they denied such
a connection. It is also important to note here that the laws that people were
willing to disobey were unrelated to the laws they read about previously in the
newspaper stories. The effect observed here spreads from the specific to the
general.
57 See ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLEY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 155
(1993) (the correlation between attitudes and behavior is moderate but not perfect).
58 Laboratory experiments in which subjects are induced to engage in unethical or
unlawful conduct to further scientific understanding of human behavior has a
colorful history in social psychology and related disciplines. Perhaps the most
well-known example is the set of studies conducted in the 1960s by Stanley
Milgram in which volunteers were led to believe they were administering electric
shocks to other volunteers. Milgram sought to understand why average, otherwise
law-abiding citizens could engage in atrocities such as those that occurred in Nazi
Germany. In his obedience studies, Milgram demonstrated that most people could
be persuaded to administer (what appeared to be) painful and harmful electric
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One alternative method for measuring compliance uses a
mock trial paradigm. Participants play the role of jurors, and after
hearing the trial evidence and the judge’s instructions on the law,
they select an individual verdict preference of Guilty or Not Guilty.
The trial materials can be designed so that the evidence is
uncontroverted (either in favor of conviction or acquittal). Thus, in
this carefully constructed situation, if participants are to follow the
law as given to them by the judge, then they must select the decision
required by the uncontroverted evidence. Selection of the other
verdict indicates that the juror has decided to engage in juror
nullification – i.e., to not comply with the law as explained by the
judge. This method of measuring compliance was employed in the
present experiment, and is described in further detail below.
2. Experimental Method
a. Participants and Materials
Participants were 228 undergraduate students.59 Participants
were exposed to a story that functioned as a prime that consisted of a
videotaped news story from the television program “60 Minutes.”
The focus of the program was on David Cash, an 18-year-old who
watched as his friend abducted a 7-year-old girl in the women’s
bathroom in a Nevada casino. Upon seeing his friend restrain the
girl, Cash walked out of the bathroom and did nothing while his
friend raped and murdered the girl.60 Cash and the friend spent the
next two days gambling, and Cash bragged about the crime to
friends upon their return home to Los Angeles.
shocks to another person by applying surprising little social pressure. Milgram’s
work on obedience to authority undoubtedly advanced our understanding of what
Hanna Arendt has called “the banality of evil”; at the same time, the psychological
harm experienced by human subjects in these studies (deriving from the
knowledge about one’s own capability and willingness to inflict harm on another
person) is now considered by most in the scientific community to be ethically
problematic.
59 Of these participants 152 were female; 30 were African-American, 36 were Asian
or Asian-American, 26 were Hispanic, and 136 were white.
60 Cash claimed that he did not know a crime was in progress until after it was too
late. He stated, however, that his friend admitted to the crime immediately after
emerging from the bathroom.
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The 60 Minutes videotape was followed by a written story,
which appeared to participants to be a newspaper account, but was
actually fictional. Participants read one of two versions of the followup story. In the Just Outcome story, David Cash is prosecuted for
being an accessory to the murder after the fact, and receives a
sentence of one year in prison. In the Unjust Outcome story, David
Cash receives no punishment.61
In the second part of the experiment, participants served as
mock jurors in a case unrelated to the David Cash story. The written
materials described a homeless defendant accused of stealing a
shopping cart he used to store his personal belongings. Participants
were informed that stealing a shopping cart is a felony. The case
materials indicated that the defendant had two prior felony
convictions, and that the jurisdiction has a “three strikes and you’re
out” rule. The materials made clear that the defendant, if found
guilty, must be sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of
parole.
The undisputed facts of the case together with the judge’s
instructions unambiguously indicated that the law requires a verdict
of Guilty. The judge explicitly instructed the jurors that they must
follow the law as it is given to them, and must not let sympathy or
prejudice bias their decision. Thus, participants who rendered a Not
Guilty “verdict” did so despite the judge’s explicit instruction that
they were required to apply the law to the facts of the case,
regardless of how they might feel personally about the law -- that is,
they engaged in juror nullification.62 Each subject’s verdict
61

Pilot testing (with different participants) revealed that on average, participants
believed that a sentence of about a year imprisonment was a fair punishment for
David Cash. Pilot test participants were also asked to rate the justness of the
punishment in the David Cash story for each prime condition, on a scale from 1
(extremely unjust) to 7 (extremely just). Participants rated the just prime
punishment (one year in jail for David Cash) (M = 4.21) significantly more just
than the unjust prime (no punishment for David Cash) (M = 2.87), t(57) = -3.11, p <
.01. There were no significant differences based on participant race or gender in
the justness ratings of the prime (all F’s < 1).
62 The evidence presented makes clear that the homeless defendant who stole the
shopping cart is undoubtedly guilty. It was nonetheless expected that some
participants would be tempted to render a Not Guilty decision in this case because
many people would view imposing a punishment of life in prison with no parole
for a relatively minor theft offense as disproportionate and excessive. There is
room for disagreement here, of course, as evidenced by the popular support for
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preference of Guilty or Not Guilty thereby served as the measure of
compliance or non-compliance with the law.
b. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the Just Outcome or
Unjust Outcome condition. Upon entering the laboratory, they were
presented with the David Cash news story video, and were then
presented with a follow-up newspaper story in which David Cash
either was punished (Just Outcome) or was not punished (Unjust
Outcome). A cover story was provided to ensure that the prime was
assimilated into the later judgment: the putative purpose of the
study was to assess participants’ judgments about the quality of the
journalism represented in the story. Participants were asked to
provide ratings of the 60 Minutes program, as well as of the followup newspaper item reporting the outcome of the case.
Questionnaires elicited participants’ opinions concerning the extent
to which the news item was clear, in-depth, well-organized, etc. The
questionnaires served as filler tasks.
As part of the cover story, participants were then greeted by a
different experimenter and taken to a different room to participate in
a “second” experiment. After signing a separate consent form,
participants were informed that they would act as mock jurors
whose task was to render a verdict in a criminal case. Participants
read the trial materials, and then privately indicated their personal
verdict preference of Guilty or Not Guilty.
3. Experimental Results
For the mock trial data, non-compliance rates were measured
by the proportion of all participants who made Not Guilty decisions.
The higher the proportion of Not Guilty decisions, the level of
noncompliance. According to the Flouting Thesis, observing legal
injustice leads to non-compliance. It was expected, therefore, that
the “three strikes and you’re out” sentencing policies that exist in several states.
See TOM R. TYLER, ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997). The
possibility of different reactions to the shopping cart theft case makes it
particularly useful for these purposes, because the variation in responses permits
detection of differences that are attributable to the justice prime.
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compared to those primed with a Just Outcome, participants primed
with an Unjust Outcome in the David Cash case would exhibit a
greater rate of non
- compliance, in the form of a higher proportion of
Not Guilty decisions in the case of the homeless man.63 This flouting
hypothesis is directly contrary to another plausible effect of the
justice prime: it might be that participants told that David Cash was
not punished (Unjust Prime) would seek more punishment in the
case of the homeless man, compared to participants told that David
Cash was punished (Just Prime). This is because people who witness
an injustice sometimes become more punitive as a result.64 This
experiment, therefore, pits the Flouting Thesis against an alternative
hypothesis that predicts the opposite outcome.
Analysis of the data revealed that, in fact, and contrary to my
hypothesis, there was no statistically significant difference overall
between Just and Unjust prime groups in proportion of Not Guilty
decisions.65 This failure to detect a difference between the two
primed groups suggests a boundary condition on the Flouting
Thesis, so that perceptions of injustice might not influence
compliance with the law in the context of juror decision making. To
explore this possibility further, I separated the participants into two
groups based on gender.66 This generated a total of four groups:

63

A total of 21 participants indicated that they had heard of the David Cash story
before. An analysis of the data excluding the these participants did not change the
results reported here.
64
See Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg & Philip E Tetlock,. Sober Second Thought:
The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of
Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. BULL. 563 (1998) (Participants who
watched a film about a bully who beats up someone were more likely to behave
punitively toward a tort defendant in an unrelated matter, compared with
participants who did not watch the film).
65 Participants primed with an Unjust Outcome chose a verdict preference of Not
Guilty 55.2% of the time, while participants primed with a Just outcome chose a
verdict preference of Not Guilty 44.8% of the time. This apparent difference does
not reach statistical significance. 2 (1) = 0.19; p = .66.
66 The nature of the David Cash case suggested examining whether gender
moderates the role of the injustice prime on compliance behavior. This is because
the case involved a rape, with a female victim and male perpetrators. The nature of
this crime may well have activated gender stereotypes that differentially influence
male and female participants. See Sheila T. Murphy, The Impact of Factual Versus
Fictional Media Portrayals on Cultural Stereotypes, 560 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 165, 165 (1998) (demonstrating that
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males primed with a Just Outcome, males primed with an Unjust
Outcome, females primed with a Just Outcome, and females primed
with an Unjust Outcome.
Next, the effects of both gender and prime, as well as the
interaction between gender and prime, on verdict preference were
examined.67 The Technical Appendix summarizes the logistic
regression68 models described herein. A model that included Prime,
Gender, and Prime x Gender as independent variables revealed that
the Prime x Gender interaction had a significant effect on verdict, as
illustrated in Figure 2.69 The patterns are suggestive: women were
more likely to choose a Not Guilty verdict preference in the Unjust
Prime condition (45.8%), than in the Just Prime condition (31.9%).70
On the other hand, men were more likely to choose a Not Guilty
verdict preference in the Just Prime condition (56.8%) than in the
Unjust Prime condition (38.5%).71

exposure to gender stereotypic portrayals can influence subsequent interpretations
of unrelated events).
67 Because of the small number of non-white participants, the possible interaction
of participant race and prime could not be examined reliably.
68
Logistic regression is a statistical technique for testing relationships between
variables when the dependent variable (here, verdict preference) is dichotomous
or contains ordered categories (here, there are two possible verdict preferences,
Guilty or Not Guilty. The chi-squared test statistic reported here indicates the
overall fit of the model. See JACOB COHEN, ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE
REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 504 (3rd ed.
2003).
69 2(1) = 5.31; p < .05
70 2 (1) = 3.02; p = .08. Note that this comparison of “simple main effects” did not
reach conventional levels of statistical significance at p < .05. The overall Model 3
including the interaction, however, is statistically significant at p < .05. Id.
71 2 (1) = 2.52; p = .11. Note that this comparison did not reach conventional levels
of statistical significance at p < .05. The overall Model 3 including the interaction,
however, is statistically significant at p < .05. Id
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Figure 2. Non-Compliance Rate as a Function of Gender
For female participants, the effect of Prime was similar to that
observed in Experiment 1: exposure to a perceived unjust outcome in
the David Cash case led to greater willingness to engage in noncompliance, compared to exposure to a perceived just outcome. But
for male participants, the pattern was reversed: exposure to a
perceived just outcome in the David Cash case led to greater
willingness to engage in non-compliance. Male participants exposed
to a perceived unjust outcome in the David Cash case tended to
comply more, and to indicate a verdict preference of Guilty, as
required by the application of the judge's instructions in the
shopping cart theft case.
The reasons for these gender differences are unclear,72 but
may stem from differences in attitudes between males and females
because of their historical position in the legal system.73 These
72

The gender difference observed here was unexpected, and a definitive
explanation for this difference requires further study.
73 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 2151, 2154-57 (1995) (“Criminal law is -- and has been for centuries -- a
system of rules conceived and enforced by men, for men, and against men”); Mary
Becker, The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: Access to Justice for Battered Women, 12
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 63 (2003) (“Our legal system routinely fails women who live
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attitudinal differences may have been primed by the nature of the
materials in the case, because the case involved a crime of violence
against a female victim committed by male perpetrators. Consider
first the responses of male participants who learned of a genderrelated injustice in the legal system (i.e., David Cash receives no
punishment). The exposure to an unjust result in the David Cash
case may have motivated male participants to reaffirm (or even
strengthen) the legal system, and their belief that males and females
are equally protected by it. As a result, in the subsequent task, they
are more likely to vote Guilty in the homeless case, thereby
complying with the judge’s instructions and upholding the rule of
law. That is, if men feel more invested in the legal system compared
to women, then they might be more strongly motivated to uphold
the legitimacy of the system in the face of a threat. This motivation to
affirm the legal system might have been exaggerated in this case
because male participants were faced with a threat to the legitimacy
of the legal system that raised the possibility that the law
systematically fails to punish male perpetrators who in fact deserve
punishment. Thus, the unjust failure of the law to punish David
Cash caused male participants to follow the law in the subsequent
task and find the homeless defendant Guilty. By contrast, consider
the male participants who learned that the legal system imposed on
David Cash the punishment he was perceived to have deserved. A
perceived just outcome may have confirmed for male participants
that the legal system indeed works to serve and protect its all of its
citizens, and in the absence of any threat to the legitimacy of the
legal system, male participants subsequently may have felt they had
license to bend the rules in the name of justice for the homeless
defendant in the second task.
Contrast this pattern of responses with those of female
participants, who may have had prior doubts about the legitimacy of

with domestic violence…”); Susan Estrich, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM
VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO SAY NO (1987) (arguing that the legal system fails women
who say no); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the
Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1389 (1997) (arguing that the law of
provocation as mitigation to murder is in fact biased against women despite being
facially neutral); Victoria Nourse, The "Normal" Successes and Failures of Feminism
and the Criminal Law, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 951 (2000) (arguing that feminist
reforms in the criminal law have failed in certain areas).
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the legal system that were confirmed by exposure to a perceived
unjust outcome in the David Cash case. The unjust outcome in this
case may have made these doubts especially salient because the
injustice involved a crime against a female victim. A prior belief that
the legal system has not adequately served and protected the female
participants' ingroup (i.e., females) was confirmed in the Unjust
Outcome condition, leading female participants in that experimental
group to feel a lesser obligation to comply with the law when it
would lead to yet another injustice in the case of the homeless
defendant who stole the shopping cart. In the Just Outcome
condition where David Cash was punished, there was no such
priming of prior beliefs about the historical failure of the legal
system with respect to women, so that female subjects who see the
legal system imposing on David Cash the punishment he deserved
perhaps felt some obligation to uphold the legal system; in this case
the legal system is affirmed by complying with the law in the case of
the homeless man who stole the shopping cart, regardless of the
disproportionate punishment that resulted.
It must be acknowledged that without more evidence it is not
yet possible to provide a complete explanation for the different
responses of men and women observed in Experiment 2. Recall that,
as revealed in the pilot data, male and female subjects perceived a
similar level of injustice in the Unjust Outcome version of the David
Cash story - there were no significant differences in gender in the
Likert scale ratings of the justness of no punishment for David Cash.
Thus, the observed differences in male and female participants’ noncompliance rates in the second part of the experiment were unlikely
caused by different, gender-based attitudes of the justness of the
David Cash story prime. On the other hand, the results are consistent
with prior research that demonstrates that men and women react
quite differently when exposed to media portrayals involving female
stereotypes.74 Moreoever, the pattern of results obtained in
Experiment 2 is consistent with both of the two rival hypotheses
See J. Gerard Power, Sheila Murphy, & Gail Coover, Priming Prejudice: How
Stereotypes and Counter-Stereotypes Influence Attribution of Responsibility and
Credibility Among Ingroups and Outgroups, 23 HUMAN COMM. RES. 36 (1996) (finding
that, compared to women, when men are primed with a female stereotype, they
exhibit larger shifts in credibility assessments of women’s accounts of sexual
harassment, rape, and spouse abuse).
74
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presented earlier: the compliance behavior of female participants
supports the Flouting Thesis; the compliance behavior of male
participants supports the anger-blame hypothesis posited by Lerner
and colleagues.75
Despite the preliminary nature of the inferences to be drawn
from the results of Experiment 2, several features of both
experiments are noteworthy. First, the duration of exposure to
perceived legal injustice in the two experiments presented here was
exceedingly brief – in some ways artificially so. In both experiments
participants exposure to perceived legal injustice lasted no more
than 20 minutes. Perceived legal injustice that people observe
outside of the laboratory is sometimes longer in duration and more
intense in its experienced effects.76 How could it be the case that brief
exposure to unjust legal rules causes people to be less willing to
comply with unrelated laws that regulate their everyday behavior?
In the next section, I consider explanations for the influence of
perceived injustice on general diminished compliance.
III. PERCEIVED INJUSTICE IN THE LAW AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Can perceived legal injustices result in lower respect for the
law generally? The experimental evidence presented here suggests
that it can. Real life events also suggest that this is the case. Consider,
for example, the O.J. Simpson verdict, considered to be just by some,
but strongly opposed by many others. Opponents of the verdict
expressed strong sentiments after the verdict was publicized:
The guy is as guilty as sin. . . . This trial was a big
fraud.77
O.J. Simpson got to go home to his big king size bed
where he used to beat his wife. . . . I’m getting to a

75 See Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg & Philip E Tetlock,. Sober Second
Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of
Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. BULL. 563 (1998).
76 See the example of the O.J. Simpson trial, discussed infra in Part III.
77 Al [last name withheld].
Interviewed on NPR’s All Things Considered,
10/12/95.
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point where I even question my belief in God.78
Because of the intense media interest focused on the case,
many people had a strong opinion about the justice of the verdict.
For those who perceived the verdict as unjust, these perceptions
were associated with broader perceptions about the criminal justice
system and the law. For example, a Los Angeles Times poll
conducted just after the Simpson verdict indicated that 70% of Los
Angeles residents had “only some” or “very little” confidence in the
criminal justice system.79
Consider also another case that provoked widespread
assessments of legal injustice: the public reaction to the acquittal of
the police officers who beat Rodney King. One half of Californians
surveyed shortly after the trial said they had confidence in the court
system as a result of the acquittals.80 The polling data following
verdicts in this case as well as in the O.J. Simpson case suggest that
perceived injustice in the law can lead to lowered respect for and
compliance with the law. Similarly, the experimental evidence
presented in this Article suggests that cases perceived as having
been wrongly decided, and laws perceived to be poorly conceived or
downright foolish, can lead to lowered respect for law generally and
greater willingness to flout it, even in unrelated domains.
In this Part, I suggest several different possibilities to explain
the influence of perceived injustice on willingness to flout the law in
everyday life. Because the empirical evidence presented in this
Article in many ways represents an initial foray into previously
uncharted territory, the arguments that follow are presented in the
spirit of conjectures designed to generate discussion and debate;
more work needs to be done to demonstrate persuasively the nature
and extent of specific factors contributing to the connection between
perceived unjust laws and reduced compliance generally with the
78

Cheryl [last name withheld]. Interviewed on NPR’s All Things Considered,
10/12/95.
79 Los Angeles Times, October 8, 1995, at S2, The Simpson Legacy, by Cathleen
Decker. See also, Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1995, at A1, Half of Americans
Disagree with Verdict, by Cathleen Decker & Sheryl Stolberg (reporting similar
lack of confidence in the criminal justice system in a national poll not limited to
Los Angeles residents).
80 The Recorder, December 11, 1992, at 1, Poll Shows Courts Rate Low in Public
Opinion, by Alexander Peters.
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law. Nonetheless, I discuss several potential explanations which are
at least plausible given the experimental evidence.
A. The Influence of Popular Culture on Attention to Perceived Legal
Injustice
In the United States, popular culture is heavily influenced by
law and the legal system. Even as early as the nineteenth century,
Alexis de Tocqueville noted the close connection between American
law and American culture:
As most public men are or have formerly been lawyers,
they bring the usages and the turn of ideas that are
their own into the handling of affairs. The jury serves
to familiarize all classes with them. Judicial language
thus becomes in a way the vulgar tongue; the spirit of
the lawyer, born inside the schools and the courts,
therefore spreads little by little beyond their precincts;
it so to speak infiltrates all society, it descends into the
lowest ranks…81
The propensity of the law to inhabit the popular imagination
in the United States is more evident today than ever before.82
Hundreds of movies involve portrayals of trials.83 A substantial
proportion of television programs focus exclusively on law, lawyers,
or criminal justice, and television news magazines (for example 60
Minutes, 20/20) also regularly focus on legal topics. Included in
ABC’s fall 2004 lineup is a seven-part documentary depicting a real
jury deciding a real capital criminal case.84 There is at least one cable
television station (Court TV) that is devoted entirely to legal topics.
Many best-selling novels are based on legal topics, and print news
magazines and newspapers also devote a significant portion of space
to law related stories.85 In sum, stories and shows about the law have
a broad popular appeal in the United States.
81

Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, eds. Harvey C. Mansfield and
Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 258.
82 See Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 527 (1986);
Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and
Spectator Sports, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 185 (1987). Richard Sherwin has argued that
law and popular culture have become so intertwined that the distinction between
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Law related television dramas, news shows, newspapers
articles, and novels tend to highlight certain aspects of the law (for
example, violent crime, consumer fraud, trials, prisons) and ignore
others for dramatic effect.86 As a result, there is a natural focus on
whether justice is done. Viewers and readers naturally want to
know, did the person or people depicted get what they deserve? The
interests of justice are focal regardless of whether the story is
criminal or civil. In either case, people notice whether the legal
system is depicted as regulating behavior in a way that makes sense,
or conversely, whether it is portrayed as imposing arbitrary
demands or unfairly exempting people from punishment.87 When
the legal system is portrayed as failing to serve the interests of justice
reality and fiction has, to a large extent, collapsed. Richard K. Sherwin, WHEN
LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE ix-x
(2000). Sherwin illustrates his point with the example of the videotaped grand
jury testimony of President Clinton in which he defended himself against charges
that he lied under oath about his sexual conduct with a young White House intern.
The television broadcast of the testimony, viewed by millions of people, was
featured in an article in the New York Times the following day, written by the
paper’s movie critic, who drew comparisons between the President’s testimony
and the film My Dinner With Andre. (The New York Times, September 22, 1998,
Section A; at 16, The Testing of a President: In the Camera’s Eye—Critic’s
Notebook, by Caryn James).
83 For an incomplete list, see http://www.usfca.edu/pj/index.html.
84See
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/ABCNEWSSpecials/in_the_jury_room.html,
last visited August 27, 2004.
85
Occasionally, a case captures the popular imagination (or at least the
imagination of television producers and newspaper editors) and garners an
extraordinary amount of coverage. For example, for the nine months that the O.J.
Simpson trial lasted, an ordinary citizen was hard pressed to avoid the case. The
trial itself was broadcast on every major television network on a daily basis for 133
days (displacing devotees of soap operas and other popular daytime shows). Time,
May 29, 1995 Volume 145, No. 22, Soap Operas: The Old and the Desperate, by
Gina Bellafante. Coverage of the trial was recapped on the news nearly every
night, newspapers covered the trial on a daily basis, and at the moment the verdict
was announced, 150 million people were glued to their tv sets (even though it
occurred in the middle of the work day).
86 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, When Lawyers Were Heroes, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1131
(1996).
87 See Carolyn Hafer, Do Innocent Victims Threaten the Belief in a Just World? Evidence
From a Modified Stroop Task. 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH., 165 (2000)
(demonstrating that small scale negative events can heighten concern for fairness).
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(whether in a drama or in news reporting on real laws or cases), the
effects might reach farther than the particular law or legal procedure
that is the focus of the show or news story.88 A portrayal of injustice
in the legal system may cause people to question the integrity of not
only the particular law, or judge, or jury, or attorney portrayed, but
may also cause them to call into question the integrity of the legal
system itself.
The cultural influences that lead people to question the integrity
of legal system might also have consequences that emerge
behaviorally – that is, people might violate the law more than they
would have if they did not question the law’s integrity. In the next
section, I will argue that compliance decisions are supported and
sustained by community norms of commonsense justice. In the
context of a general perception that the legal system is generally just,
these norms nourish a baseline level of behavioral compliance with
the law. But if the delicate balance that encourages compliance is
disturbed, these same community norms can provide the impetus to
flout the law.
B. Expressive Law, Perceived Injustice, & Compliance
The delicate balance that promotes compliance is assisted
enormously by the fact that much of the time, the law accurately
reflects prevalent mores about permissible behavior.89 Thus, criminal
law prohibits murder, rape, robbery, larceny, and a host of other
acts, the propriety of which almost everyone agrees. The general
convergence of the requirements of the law and commonsense
justice means that most people comply with the law most of the
time, because they would have refrained from doing the prohibited
act, whether it is murder, rape, or robbery, quite apart from the
existence of its legally prohibited status.

See Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg & Philip E Tetlock,. Sober Second
Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of
Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. BULL. 563 (1998); J. Gerard Power,
Sheila Murphy, & Gail Coover, Priming Prejudice: How Stereotypes and CounterStereotypes Influence Attribution of Responsibility and Credibility Among Ingroups and
Outgroups, 23 HUMAN COMM. RES. 36 (1996).
89 See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV.
339, 375 (2000).
88
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On the other hand, people also refrain from legally prohibited
acts that they may be genuinely tempted to engage in, such as
certain traffic offenses (for example, driving through a red light at an
empty intersection), or offenses against other persons (for example,
punching someone who they feel really deserves it). Democratically
produced legislation, for example, can be perceived as a signal of
community norms about behavior.90 In declaring conduct to be
prohibited, the law expresses social disapproval of that conduct,
which can itself strengthen people’s commitment to acting legally—
even when the fear of punishment is absent.91 Such moral
commitments can operate even on people who have not internalized
them, through social pressure to avoid the loss of esteem in others’
eyes that would result from engaging in prohibited conduct.92 In this
90

See McAdams, supra note 28.

91 Id.

See JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 112 (1974); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338,
355 (1997). McAdams argues that we generally seek the esteem (good opinion,
respect) of others. So long as there is a consensus about the esteem-worthiness of
engaging in a particular behavior, and so long as people know that there is some
risk of detection if they engage in that behavior, then a social norm can arise
governing the behavior. There is some empirical support for this notion. The
threat of peer disapproval exerts a significant influence on self-reported decisions
to engage in a criminal offense. See Grasmick & Green, supra note 7.
This idea of norm-regulated behavior is also captured in social
psychological theories, such as Fishbein & Ajzen's theory of reasoned action,
which takes into account "subjective norms" in modeling the attitude-behavior
relation. According to the theory of reasoned action, the most important predictor
of behavior – intention -- is in turn determined by a person's attitude toward the
behavior and by the subjective norm. The subjective norm is simply the person’s
perception that relevant others in the social environment expect him or her to
behave in a certain way. Thus, if a person behaves in a manner contrary to social
expectations, he or she can expect negative social consequences. See MARTIN
FISHBEIN & ICEK AJZEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE, INTENTION, AND BEHAVIOR: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND RESEARCH (1975).
Of course, social norms vary across cultures and populations. The
sociologist Elijah Anderson has argued that among inner-city African-American
youth, there is a code of the street that is centered on the issue of respect. See Elijah
Anderson, Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Lie of the Inner City, 273
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 81, 88 (1999). As a result, a person must maintain an
appearance (including clothing, gait, facial and verbal expression) that
communicates willingness to engage in violence when necessary, must be willing
to engage in the violent resolution of disputes, and must be willing to seek revenge
92
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way, the law itself informs people’s ideas about moral and immoral
behavior.
To some extent, people also obey the law because they feel they
owe a general obligation to legitimate authority.93 If the law is
generally seen as accurately reflecting community norms, it is
intuitively plausible that people will be more inclined to defer to it as
a moral authority.94 Under these circumstances, the very labeling of a
certain act as criminal might make people more aware of the socially
harmful quality of that act.95 For example, before the existence of
severe criminal punishments for drunk driving, many people were
unaware that drunk driving had such grave consequences. It may be
that drunk driving is increasingly considered in moral terms
precisely because it has been labeled criminal.96
Thus, laws that plausibly signal community attitudes result in
deference and compliance, even if the value expressed had not been
previously internalized by all members of the community, as in the
drunk driving example. Severe punishment for drunk driving
signals the risk of severe harm associated with the act; the previously
established moral credibility of the law generally ensures that the
signal will be heeded. However, laws that are perceived as
in the event of a threat to one’s self-esteem, all to ensure that respect is secured and
maintained.
As another example, norms motivated by fear of peer stigma regarding
honor and violence are very different in the Southern U.S., compared to the
Northern U.S. See Dov Cohen et al., When You Call Me That, Smile! How Norms for
Politeness, Interactions Styles, and Aggression Work Together in Southern Culture, 62
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 257 (1999). Southern white males follow norms of honor,
whereby they feel that if they do not respond to an insult, others will view them as
less manly. Because this Southern culture of honor has features that involve
undercurrents of violence, norms of politeness and hospitality have evolved in the
South that function to keep conflicts below the surface. Thus, the behavioral ritual
of using anger, rudeness, biting humor, and insults as warning mechanisms for
curbing others' offensive behaviors is more commonly observed in the North. In
sum, although there may be variation in social norms across sub-populations, they
nonetheless play an important causal role in explaining factors that motivate
behaviors that are observed with regularity within a community. Id.
93 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 41-68 (1990).
94 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 476.
95 See Andenaes, supra note 30.
96 But in the example of drunk driving, it also might be the case that law followed
changes in social norms. See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the
Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
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completely implausible signals of community attitudes -- that is,
laws that strike people as so far off the mark that they could not
possibly represent what the community believes or values – are
likely to have different effects. If the law is seen as imposing unjust
or immoral obligations, then rather than signaling community
attitudes, the law instead might be perceived as irrelevant, and
intuitively, there would be little reason to defer to it as a moral
authority.97 For example, if the criminal law were to prohibit all
sexual intercourse between unmarried couples, most people would
view that law as discrepant from their own personal moral views
about sexual intercourse; as a result, they would be willing to
disobey the law. Further, such a law might have an even broader
effect. It might cause people to view the law generally in a different
light – as a set of irrelevant and arbitrary rules rather than a coherent
expression of community values.98
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS
Recognition of initial sources of perceived injustice is a
necessary condition for controlling the general diminished
compliance it triggers.99 The sources of perceived injustice that are
discussed in this Article generally fall into two categories: perceived
unjust legal decisions, such as jury verdicts, and perceived unjust
legislation. The problem of perceptions of unjust jury verdicts is
perhaps the more difficult problem from a policy perspective.
Criminal jury verdicts that are perceived to be unjust oftentimes are
97See

Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 476.
See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 473-476. See also Cooter, supra note 8. It is
worth noting that perceptions of injustice might vary by community, where legal
rules that govern issues that are of particular importance within a particular
community are subject to closer scrutiny. If a legal rule seems outrageously unjust
to members of a community, this might cause a decline in the moral authority of
the law in that community and not in other communities. Thus, a legal rule
mandating English-Only might be perceived as unjust by Latino communities; a
set of legal rules that mandate harsher prison sentences for cocaine in crack form
than cocaine in powder form might be perceived as unjust by African-American
communities; a legal rule prohibiting free downloading of music via the Internet
might be perceived as unjust by communities of music fans; a legal rule
prohibiting possession of firearms might be perceived as unjust by the citizenry in
discrete parts of the country.
99 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 488.
98
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indeed unjust from a narrow distributive justice perspective:
factually guilty people are sometimes acquitted by juries, and as a
result, people who have in fact committed a criminal act sometimes
do not receive their just desert. Likewise, factually innocent people
are sometimes convicted by juries. Of course, acquittals represent a
judgment on the part of the fact finder (i.e. the jury or judge) that the
prosecution has not met its burden of proof, and so many acquittals
that appear unjust from a narrow distributive justice perspective are
morally defensible when procedural justice considerations are taken
into account. Nevertheless, many people find it difficult to give
proper weight to procedural justice considerations once they have
made an assessment about the “correct” outcome from a distributive
perspective. For example, from the point of view of a person who
believes that O.J. Simpson did in fact kill two people without
justification or excuse, there is little solace in the prospect that the
jury held reasonable doubts about the prosecution having proved
every element of each crime – the distributive justice worry
overwhelms procedural justice concerns in this context.100 In sum,
because information about jury verdicts is, and should be,101
available to the public, perceived unjust jury verdicts are bound to
occur, and to cause general diminished compliance in the ways
outlined in this Article.
A second prototype of perceived legal injustice is legislation
or other legal rules that conflict with commonsense notions of what
justice requires. Perhaps the most salient historical example is the
prohibition on the manufacture, distribution or sale of alcoholic

See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
It is possible that televising criminal trials may exacerbate feelings of perceived
injustice regarding verdicts in notorious cases. On the other hand, televised trials
provide a unique opportunity to educate the public about the importance of
procedural and other safeguards that sometimes lead to verdicts that are unjust
from a narrow distributive perspective but that serve the interests of justice in
other ways. The considerations weighing in favor of and against the televising of
criminal trials are numerous and extend beyond the scope of this Article. See, Ruth
Ann Strickland & Richter H. Moore, Jr., Cameras in State Courts: A Historical
Perspective, 78 JUDICATURE 128, 135 (1994); Kelly L. Cripe, Comment: Empowering the
Audience: Television's Role in the Diminishing Respect for the American Judicial System,
6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235 (1999); David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court
TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System,
35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785 (1993).
100
101
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beverages imposed by the Eighteenth Amendment. During the
period when the Eighteenth Amendment was in force, the law
prohibiting alcohol was notoriously disobeyed.102 Toward the end of
the prohibition era, prominent leaders worried that such widespread
lawlessness had weakened respect for the law generally, leading to
widespread diminished compliance with laws unrelated to
prohibition – that is, they worried about the Flouting Thesis.103
Contemporary examples are not always associated with the same
extent of widespread disobedience, but these examples provoke
controversy and heated discussion nonetheless. These include
particular aspects of drug laws (such as the crack/powder cocaine
sentence disparity implicit in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines),104
mandatory minimum sentences of incarceration for certain crimes,105
sodomy statutes,106 foster care regulations,107 and smoking
ordinances,108 to name just a few.
Laws that are enacted with the intention to change social
norms and behavior sometimes are met with resistance if the law
departs too substantially from the view of ordinary people.109
Outside of courtroom verdicts, many discrepancies between laws
and attitudes represent avoidable sources of lawbreaking, because
perceptions of injustice and the diminished respect for the legal
system that follow can destabilize the law-abiding behavior of
See Harry G. Levine, The Birth of American Alcohol Control: Prohibition, the Power
Elite and the Problem of Lawlessness. 1985 CONTEMPORARY DRUG PROBLEMS 63 (1985);
DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL Prohibition (1979).
103 See id.
104 See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283
(1995)(“By demanding too much doctrinal order, we have produced a doctrine
that demands too little justice”). William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1795 (1998) (“Differential enforcement breeds resentment,
which undermines the law's normative force”).
105 See Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years after the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87 (2003); Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for
Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 223.
106 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
107 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS (2002).
108 See, e.g., The New York Times, May 12, 2004 at A1, A City of Quitters? In Strict
New York, 11% Fewer Smokers, by Richard Perez-Pena.
109 See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
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ordinary people.110 By limiting the incongruities between the
condemnation expressed by a particular legal rule and the severity of
condemnation implicit in public attitudes, perceived injustice can be
diminished.111 The key question, then, is how to go about reducing
discrepancies between legal rules and citizen attitudes.
In principle, there are several ways to better harmonize legal
rules and public attitudes. If there is an existing social norm
regarding the issue addressed by the law, one method involves
reforming the legal rule in question to better align it with the existing
social norm; another method involves altering the social norm to
better align it with the existing legal rule.112 Legal rules sometimes
do not directly implicate social norms, but instead implicate what
are better described as socially shared attitudes. In these cases, it is
possible to conform the law to public attitudes. I discuss these
possibilities in turn.
Modifying the legal rule to better reflect the existing social
norm involves a number of considerations. First, we must first make
a determination that the existing norm promotes desirable social
policies and that the legal rule is not as effective as the existing social
norm. Thus we must decide that we want the legal rule to look more
like the social norm. Of course, it is not always the case that the
social norm is laudable. Historically, there are many instances of
prevailing social norms that in retrospect many would agree were
wrongheaded. These include the norm against the equal
participation of women, racial minorities and gays and lesbians in
social and political life; the norm against homosexual sex; norms
against interracial marriage; norms permitting harm to the
environment such as littering and polluting the air and water, to
name just a few.
Second, assuming the existing norm is desirable, we must
make a determination that there is in fact a unified social norm to
which we can conform the legal rule. This is often not the case. For
example, some of the most contentious issues of the day such as
same sex marriage, abortion, physician assisted suicide, and the
death penalty involve such deep differences of opinion that we
See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 476.
See id.
112 Of course, these two methods are not mutually exclusive; both the rule and the
social norm can be modified in an attempt to make them more compatible.
110
111
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cannot hope to neatly conform the legal rule to existing norms.113 In
these cases our best strategy is to rely on fair procedures to ensure
that the decisions of legal actors are viewed as legitimate and thus
likely to be complied with.114
Sometimes, the legal rule in question does not really implicate a
social norm so much as it implicates a socially shared attitude about
what justice requires. In these situations, it is possible to measure
empirically the socially shared attitude and then conform the law to
the consensus (assuming that there is no independent reason to think
that the consensus makes for bad legal policy).115 For example,
criminal law rules governing attempted crimes do not really
implicate an existing, articulable social norm regarding when and
whether it is permissible to attempt to commit crimes. Nevertheless,
people are likely to have intuitions about what type of conduct
ought to be punished as attempt crimes in specific situations.116
Moreover, social scientists using the right types of survey
instruments and samples ought to be able to measure these popular
intuitions.117
That this type of endeavor is possible was demonstrated by
Paul Robinson & John Darley in their book Justice, Liability and
Blame.118 They tested several different criminal law rules (e.g.,
attempt, justification, excuse, and so on) against the opinions of
citizens regarding what the content of these rules should be. But
instead of asking questions about criminal law rules in the abstract,
the authors asked people to give their opinions about factual
scenarios. For example, should a person who cases out a jewelry
store with the intention to burglarize it, but then goes no further, be
held criminally liable for attempting to commit a crime? From these
responses they inferred what people thought the rule ought to be.
Robinson and Darley found that although modern criminal law
doctrine imposes liability as soon as a person takes a substantial step
toward an offense, most people would impose no punishment when

See TOM R. TYLER, ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997).
See id.
115 See PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME (1995).
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME (1995).
113
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faced with the facts of such a case.119 Where the legal rule departs
from the consensus of the lay public regarding just desert,
lawmakers can modify the legal rule to reflect popular consensus, so
long as such consensus can be justified in criminal law theory. This
assumes, of course, that the theoretical considerations that led to the
adoption of the original rule do not overwhelm the reasons for
adopting the new, more “popular” rule. In the case of attempt crime
standards, there is a proliferation of different approaches, and there
seems to be no real consensus among scholars or lawmakers about
which approach is superior.120 In this case, therefore, a sensible
approach might be to adopt the rule that best accords with common
sense notions of what justice requires.121
The second main way to reduce the gap between legal rules
and common sense justice is to change the prevailing conception of
justice. Education of the public regarding legal rules and procedures
is a key method to pursue. Most people are woefully unaware of

119

Id. At 205.
These include: the physical proximity doctrine (liability imposed if act directly
tends toward completion of the crime), the dangerous proximity doctrine (liability
for attempt more likely as gravity and probability of the crime, as well as the
proximity of the act to the completed crime, increases), the indispensable element
test (liability imposed when the defendant has control over all indispensable
aspects of the crime), the probable desistance test (liability imposed if the crime
intended will result without interruption from outside sources), the abnormal step
test (liability imposed when defendant goes beyond the point where most others
would desist), the unequivocality test (liability imposed when the defendant’s
conduct manifests an intent to commit the crime), and the substantial step test
(liability imposed when defendant does any act that constitutes a substantial step
toward commission of the crime). See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 749-50 (3rd Ed. 2003).
121 An important caveat is in order at this point. This type of inquiry must by
nature be grounded in data. One cannot establish the criminal law in the
community’s sense of justice when claims about this sense of justice are based only
on the speaker’s own intuitions, which the speaker assumes are shared by the
public at large. Instead, this inquiry must be grounded in the community’s sense
of justice as measured by empirical observation. JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND
BLAME is a step in the right direction in this regard. As other commentators have
observed (see Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 601, 605
(2000)), there are methodological issues regarding sampling in these studies, but it
is important to keep in mind that this was an initial foray into the measurement of
community justice intuitions.
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existing legal requirements.122 One study asked the residents of five
different states about their knowledge of four different criminal law
rules.123 In each of the states the criminal law took a minority view
on at least on of the four rules, so that the rules tested varied from
state to state.124 Yet, residents of each of the five states tested had
essentially identical beliefs about the law in their state.125 The actual
legal rule in effect in their state apparently had little or no influence
on what people believed the rule to be. In fact, people’s beliefs about
what the law is in their state did not track so much the majority rule
as they tracked people’s own moral intuitions about what they
thought the rule ought to be.126
Given the goal of reducing the gap between legal rules and
common sense justice, the challenge is not only to educate people
about the content of existing legal rules, but in addition, to facilitate
a public understanding of the rationale for existing rules. Sometimes,
the facts of a well-publicized criminal case will help to make known
an existing, but previously little-known legal rule; but if the rationale
for the rule is not transparent, that rule might fall into disrepute if it
is contrary to common sense notions of justice, or if it leads to a
result widely regarded as unjust.127 In addition, the perception of an
unjust result might arise because of application of procedural rules
that most would regard as just and necessary if only they were made
aware of the existence of the procedural safeguard and associated
rationale.128
Experiment 2 demonstrated that perceptions of injustice can
have different consequences that depend on the gender of the

See John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith and Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante
Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC REV 165 (2001).
123 Id. The rules tested were: duty to assist a stranger in danger, the use of deadly
defensive force in situations where the victim can safely retreat, duty to report a
known felony, and the use of deadly force in protection of property.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 476.
128 See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003).
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perceiver.129 Recall that women were more likely to engage in juror
nullification than men when primed with a case involving rape. This
result suggests that, in examining gaps between law and common
sense justice, it is especially important to scrutinize areas in which
the law operates to the systematic disadvantage of women. It has
been long recognized that the law should formally bestow equal
treatment to men and women.130 But culture and social practices
operate to dominate women under laws that often are facially
neutral.131 I argued in the beginning of this Part that recognizing
sources of perceived injustice is a necessary condition for controlling
the general diminished compliance it triggers.132 Because there are
many sources of perceived injustice in the law,133 it seems difficult to
know where to begin the process of recognizing and narrowing gaps
between commonsense justice and legal requirements. The results of
Experiment 2 suggest one particular area in which to begin: places
where the criminal law operates to the systematic detriment of
women. This work has already begun,134 but there is undoubtedly
much work left to be done.
CONCLUSION
This Article explored the widely-assumed but little-tested belief
that specific instances of perceived injustice in the legal system can
lead to diminished deference to the law generally. Experiment 1
tested the influence of perceived unjust legal rules regarding civil
forfeiture, distribution of the income tax burden, and the right to
privacy, and demonstrated that perceived unjust legal rules cause
people to report being more likely to engage in lawbreaking in their
daily lives. Experiment 2 tested the influence of a perceived unjust
outcome of a criminal case in which a person peripherally involved
129

It is likely that other characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, play a role here
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the effects of race and ethnicity. This is, however, a topic ripe for further research.
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in a serious crime is not prosecuted. Experiment 2 demonstrated that
the failure to punish a person who is perceived to deserve
punishment can, in some circumstances, lead people to display a
greater willingness to disregard the law in their role as jurors. This
willingness to flout, however, was qualified by the gender of the
mock juror and the facts surrounding the perceived injustice: in a
rape case where a potential accomplice goes unpunished, women are
more willing than men to disregard the law in their role of jurors.
These stark gender differences highlight the need for more research
regarding the Flouting Thesis. It is undoubtedly false that perceived
injustice in the legal system leads to greater willingness to break the
law for all people, in all circumstances, at all times. This Article
presents the first experimental evidence that such a relationship
exists at all; but as such it is only a start, and more research is needed
to understand the contours of this relationship.
The notion that specific instances of legal rules, practices, and
decisions that clash with common sense notions of justice can
promote widespread lawbreaking is an idea with far reaching
implications for policies about the content of criminal law rules and
sentencing regimes, for promoting public education and awareness
about the legal system and about the rationales that underlie
controversial rules and procedures, and for examining and
rethinking legal rules and policies that can promote diminished
respect for the legal system.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Likelihood of Guilty Verdict as
a Function of Prime and Gender
Variable
Model 1: b Wald 2 Model 2: b Wald 2 Model 3: b Wald
Intercept
Prime Condition

-.19

.19

.17

.40

-.27

.38

3.72

-.13

.22

.74

.33

1.32

1.03

6.01*

-1.33

5.31*

Gender
Prime x Gender
2

.19

1.52

-2 Log L

310.17

310.37

Model

^ p < .10
*
p < .05

2

6.92^
303.44

.67
2.52

